Brian Burnell's nuclear weapons history site under construction.

email: brian@nuclear-weapons.info

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Genesis

Footnotes

See also

Violet Club

Violet Club was the first high yield weapon deployed by the British, and was intended to provide an emergency capability until a thermonuclear weapon could be developed from the Christmas Island thermonuclear tests known as Operation Grapple. After the Americans tested a thermonuclear weapon in 1952, followed by the Soviets with Joe 4, and before the UK government took a decision in July 1954 to develop a thermonuclear weapon, AWRE Aldermaston were asked in 1953 about the possibilities for a very large pure fission bomb yielding one megaton. AWRE's response referred to the Zodiak Mk.3 bomb, but progressed no further than a rudimentary study. (1)

At this time studies were also started (2) that ultimately led to a decision in 1954 to develop a thermonuclear weapon, and the design studies were split into two tracks, the Thermonuclear Bomb Type A, a hybrid type, really a very large boosted fission device, no longer regarded as a thermonuclear weapon, and the Type B, a device that derives a significant amount of energy from fusion. (3) The British at that time had not yet discovered the Teller-Ulam technique necessary to initiate fusion, and the Type B was still beyond their capabilities. The intermediate devices proposed, the Type A hybrids, were similar in concept to the Alarm Clock and Joe-4 layer cake hybrid designs of other nuclear powers. Although these Type A intermediate devices used small quantities of fusion fuel in their fissile cores to provide a supply of energetic, fast neutrons to boost the efficiency of the fission reaction, they did not derive a measurable amount of energy output from fusion.

The Violet Club warhead, known variously as Green Grass, Knobkerry, and the Interim Megaton Weapon was a pure, unboosted fission device derived from the two British Type A weapons, stripped of their fusion boosting elements. It was the largest pure fission weapon deployed by any nuclear power.

Genesis

The British Type A hybrid weapon was known as Green Bamboo, weighed approx 4,500 lb (2,045 kg) (4) and its spherical shape measured approx 45 inches diameter, with a 72-point implosion system. Green Bamboo was intended as the warhead for all projected British strategic delivery systems of the period; Yellow Sun Stage 1, a free-fall bomb for the V-bombers; Blue Steel an air-launched stand-off missile, also deployed aboard the V-bombers; and Blue Streak, a silo-based medium-range ballistic missile. Various other proposed delivery systems would also use this standardised warhead. The large girth of both Yellow Sun and Blue Steel was necessary to accomodate the large spherical implosion system of Green Bamboo. (5)

A variant with a smaller implosion sphere, fewer explosive lenses, and some other changes was substituted for Green Bamboo when it was realised that the Blue Streak ballistic missile would be unable to accommodate the weight of Green Bamboo without appreciable loss of range performance. This Type A hybrid variant was codenamed Orange Herald, (6) and its reduced size and weight was achieved by reducing the size of the surrounding explosive layers (7) to under 1'000 lbs (454 kg) (8) and this would result in less compression at the fissile core when detonated, and a reduced nuclear efficiency and yield. Less fissile material is consumed as a consequence of lower compression before fission ends as the core expands and blows itself apart. To counter this and maintain yield at the desired level of 1 MT the fissile core of Orange Herald was enlarged, and this in turn made excessive demands on scarce and expensive fissile material. Estimates computed from reliable declassified official sources of actual core cost (9) and cost per kilogram of HEU (10) put the core sizes of Green Bamboo and Orange Herald as 98 kg and 125 kg respectively, although some other published (and unverified) sources claim lower figures of 87 kg and 117 kg respectively. A useful benchmark is the declassified document written by Sir William Penney in 1953, that estimated 120 kg of HEU was required for the 1 MT Zodiak Mk.3 unboosted fission warhead. (11) This Orange Herald hybrid boosted fission design was tested at Christmas Island in 1957, yielding 720 kt, (12) although AWRE scientists considered that the boosting elements failed to work, and that it functioned as a pure fission device. (13) Estimates of the quantity of HEU used in this device and in the Green Grass pure fission warhead of Violet Club should be interpreted in this light, although there is no declassified hard evidence on this point and all published figures are speculative.

These two weapons, Green Bamboo and Orange Herald were intended as the two hybrid weapon predecessors of the first British thermonuclear weapons, based on the Granite design series that began with Short Granite, Purple Granite, Grapple X, Grapple Y, Flagpole and Halliard at Grapple Z.

Emergency Capability Weapon

Delays and failures in the Granite programme and the abandonment of Green Bamboo without a test, left a gap in the programme, and an emergency capability weapon to fill that gap was devised from elements of both Green Bamboo and Orange Herald; being known as Knobkerry, (14) or Green Grass, and the Interim Megaton Weapon. (15) There were also other factors involved in the decision to build an Interim Megaton Weapon. One being that the British production programme was by 1957 producing quantities of HEU for which there was no immediate need; and the Chiefs of Staff were reluctant to see it continue to languish in stores, unused for weapons, when it was being produced at great cost. (16) The Air Staff wanted the Interim Megaton Weapon to hoover-up the HEU allocated to them for strategic weapons but not yet used because of delays in development of thermonuclear weapons. The Air Staff view was that if the stored HEU were not used, they may lose it to the other Services. (17) The Army wanted nuclear landmines, and the Navy required HEU for a nuclear submarine reactor development programme, and 60 kg to fuel HMS Dreadnought, the Navy's first nuclear-powered submarine.

Although there are no reliable or declassified sources for this amount, and one declassified source states the core size as "up to 120 kg" (18) the Green Grass warhead containing perhaps 70–86 kg of HEU was hurriedly produced and installed in a modified Blue Danube casing, to be known as Violet Club, until a better weapon based on a later Yellow Sun casing and the Green Grass warhead could be produced. This later, fully developed weapon, engineered to robust Service standards, was to incorporate better safety devices with in-flight removal of the nuclear safety device. The earlier Violet Club weapon was expected to be short-lived. A lower standard of safety and robustness was accepted for Violet Club, (19) and the nuclear safety device was removed on the ground after loading into the aircraft. At take-off Violet Club was armed and live. Because it was thought too dangerous to fly with it except in an operational emergency, and too dangerous to attempt a landing at base, no training, exercise or other peacetime flights were ever permitted. Nor was it permitted to be transported by road to the remote V-bomber dispersal bases around the UK, where the bombers would routinely disperse to at periods of heightened international tension. It had to be stored assembled at the assigned bomber bases, since transport on public roads from nearby specialist weapon storage facilities was forbidden.

Plans for twelve Violet Club weapons were approved by the Chiefs of Staff for carriage in Vulcan and Victor aircraft, but in the event production was curtailed early, with only five produced, (20) carried by Vulcan aircraft only, and known by the RAF description of Bomb, Aircraft, HE 9'000 lb HC, (21) and their Green Grass warheads were removed for transfer to Yellow Sun casings when these became available. None were ever under RAF operational control during their short lives. Because of their complexity, and the fact that they were rushed into service as an emergency capability weapon, and that they were never proof-tested in a full nuclear test, nor been through the normal rigorous pre-Service testing process conducted by agencies independent of the designers and manufacturers, they were never formally accepted into service, or approved for Service use. Instead, the weapons were in the custody of AWRE staff at RAF bases, to be released to the RAF in the event of a national emergency being declared by the relevant authority. (22) Although Violet Club was known by the Service designation Bomb, Aircraft, HE 9'000 lb HC, this was a notional weight only. Actual weight was different. To make use of the existing Blue Danube casing without costly and time-consuming further tests, conditions that determined the known ballistic properties of the casing were replicated in Violet Club, with ballast carried to match Blue Danube's weight of 10'250 lbs and centre of gravity. The added weight of the ballbearing safety device increased total weight to 11'250 lbs (5'114 kg) when loaded into an aircraft for a 30-day readiness period, (23) although the aircraft release mechanism was limited to 11'100 lbs for a ferry flight. (24) Dispersal to remote airfields with the safety device in place was therefore not possible.

Design defects

Violet Club and Green Grass were not considered satisfactory designs and suffered from numerous design defects, some, in the case of Violet Club's casing, being inherited from the Blue Danube casing that had itself suffered from numerous defects. Many of these were attributable to it being the first British nuclear bomb, and it being the first bomb to be designed for release from aircraft flying at the great heights and speeds envisaged; and there was no experience of bomb release at more than twice the height and speed of the previous generation of medium bombers.

The Blue Danube casing also suffered from being the first bomb casing designed with a large di-electric plastic nose. There was little previous manufacturing experience of these very large plastic mouldings, with only two manufacturers in the UK able to work to the demanding standards required, and these mouldings were the cause of much frustration with operation of the radar fuzes in Blue Danube. These fuzes, based on radar altimeter technology, were omitted from Violet Club, and replaced with off-the-shelf clockwork timers backed-up with barometric fuzes. Without the requirement for radar transparency, the plastic nose was replaced with a less troublesome metallic nose in Violet Club.

The barometric fuzes themselves were an issue, because the aerodynamic design of the casing was very 'slippery' with a terminal velocity greater than Mach 2 when released from great heights and speeds. At this time, no aircraft could reach those speeds, and few could exceed Mach 1 except in a dive. Indeed, prior to the delivery of the first V-bomber in 1954, the RAF had no means of carrying the Blue Danube casing to the heights, or at the speeds required for test flights. At the high terminal speeds reached by the casing, the barometric sensing devices were prone to errors unless located where transonic shockwaves could not effect accuracy, but there was little understanding or experience to draw upon. In essence, the barometric fuzes were used in Blue Danube as 'gates' to switch on the power supply to the radar (altimeter) fuzes. This technique permitted the radar fuzes to be used sparingly, in the last few seconds before detonation at a measured height above ground, and being switched on only briefly, it was hoped that the radar fuzes would then be immune to enemy jamming. The barometric fuzes alone could not acheive the accuracy demanded without calibration to local air pressure. In Violet Club, this complex system was discarded, and a simple clockwork timer was activated at bomb release, that could be set using the casing's known measured ballistic performance data. The clockwork fuze was then backed-up with a barometric fuze and an impact fuze to ensure detonation in the event of a failed clockwork and barometic fuze.

A major defect was the reliance on batteries for all electrical power after release from the aircraft. The batteries used were 6v lead acid accumulators, - commercial motorcycle batteries, that were kept fully-charged and inserted into the weapon on the ground immediately before flight. In Violet Club they were used to charge large capacitors in the warhead firing circuits and provide power to the Blue Stone ENI (External Neutron Initiator). Both were essential components of the firing circuits. Storing the batteries outside the weapon while on the ground was thought a necessary safety break between the power supply and the firing circuits, but contributed to lengthy delays while the batteries were inserted at the last minute before flight. Later generations of weapons used ram-air-driven generators that provided no power prior to release, or thermal batteries that could be safely stored in the weapon for lengthy periods without maintenance, and the necessary safety break was provided by other means, eg speed detectors activated only by bomb release.

Other design flaws, the rushed Service entry and uncertainty about shelf-life of the weapon led to a requirement for a complete strip-down and inspection at six-monthly intervals. Each taking three weeks per weapon using AWRE civilian staff. The unstable nature of the weapon, with the fissile core being greater than one uncompressed critical mass, required that the work being done in-situ at RAF bases, causing considerable disruption to operational duties. Three principal reasons for the strip-downs were deterioration of the rubber bag lining the inside of the hollow spherical core, that was in intimate contact with the steel balls, corrosion of the steel ballbearings, which exacerbated rubber bag deterioration, and deterioration of the HE, which was prone to cracking. Replacement of the HE would cost RAF budgets in excess of £92'000 adjusted to 2007 prices. (25) The RAF were under considerable pressure to find adequate storage for the weapons at operational bases, because the weapon was too unstable to be transported by road to suitable specialist weapon storage facilities, or to be stored in close proximity to other similar weapons. One weapon per storage building was the rule. Strip-down inspections were a further hindrance to their operational duties, seriously jeopardising essential safety and servicing work on tactical nuclear weapons. (26)

Green Grass warhead

The Green Grass warhead of Violet Club was a hollow spherical implosion design; a fissile core of HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium, weapons or military grade U-235) surrounded by an explosive supercharge and a 72-lens implosion system. The HEU core brought together into one solid piece was greater than one uncompressed critical mass. To prevent spontaneous fission and keep it sub-critical the HEU was fabricated into a hollow thin-walled sphere of approximately 22 in (560mm) internal diameter and approximately 0.14 in (3.6mm) thick, although there is as yet, no declassified hard evidence to support these figures computed from other declassified data.. When triggered, the HE implosion system collapsed the core inwards into a solid sphere of approx 200 mm diameter at normal density, continuing to crush it yet smaller. The hollow core also benefited from what is referred to as levitation, where the airspace within the hollow sphere permits the collapsing shell to gather speed before impacting at the centre. This process has been described as 'hammering' the core as in driving a nail using the kinetic energy of a swinging hammer, as distinct from placing the hammerhead on a nail and pushing. Although it is not clear that British designers were aware of the benefits of a levitated design at this stage.

The Green Grass warhead contained perhaps 70–86 kg of HEU (although there are no reliable declassified sources for this figure).

The hollow spherical core was entirely supported by a tamper (believed to be tuballoy, or natural uranium) and the HE supercharge and lenses. These in turn were supported inside a cast magnesium 'honeycomb' or matrix to aid structural strength. (27) The honeycomb can be visualised as similar in concept to an eggbox supporting an egg, with holes piercing it to permit wiring and other services to pass.

Knobkerry, or Green Grass was the first deployed British warhead to dispense with the crude crush-type polonium-210 and beryllium neutron generators used to initiate fission with a burst of neutrons. These were used in all earlier weapon designs, including Little Boy, Fat Man, Blue Danube and Red Beard, and were a great inconvenience with their short shelf-life of around six to nine months before requiring replacement. The logistical difficulties were enormous. Instead, Green Grass used an Electronic Neutron Generator or ENI codenamed Blue Stone, also referred to as Unit 386D, which had the virtue of being located outside the implosion sphere and was adjustable, allowing the neutron burst to be triggered at precisely the right moment to maximise yield. Prior to release, the Blue Stone ENI drew electrical power from the aircraft via an improvised device known by the codeword Fishfryer, which supplied power to warm-up the ENI and charge capacitors. (28)

Burst heights of 3'500 ft and 6200 ft AGL (above ground level) (29) were chosen to maximise ground overpressure at 6psi, or to maximise overpressure without fireball ground contact, using a barometric fuze with a clockwork timer backup. (30) Impact and graze fuzes provided an assured detonation. With the exception of the clockwork timer, these fuzing items were inherited with the Blue Danube casing. The radar altimeter fuzes were omitted, and the radar-transparent thermoplastic nosecone was replaced with a metal nose. (31)

Safety and arming

The safety system used was inherited from the Green Bamboo design, which also had a core fabricated as a hollow spherical shell, although smaller than Green Grass, required fewer steel balls to fill it, and that weighed considerably less at 620 lbs (282 kg). (32) The weight of the safety system balls in Green Grass at 1'040 lbs (473 kg) (33) suggests a much larger diameter for the fissile core's spherical shell , although there is as yet no declassified hard evidence.

A fire in a bomb store or a traffic collision on an airfield could result in a partial crushing or collapse of the non-removable HEU core, and in turn a spontaneous nuclear chain reaction. AWRE responded by inserting a rubber bag, rather akin to an outsize female condom, though a hole in the core, and filled this with 6'500 (34) steel ball bearings weighing 1'040 lbs (473 kg). (31) That computes to balls of one inch diameter. When Green Grass warheads installed in Violet Club were later transferred to a more modern bomb casing, Yellow Sun Mk.1, the quantity of these steel balls was increased to 120,000 with a reduction in size to 0.375 in diameter (9.5 mm) to make removal easier, (35) and there is a claim elsewhere in a book commissioned by the MoD that the quantity was increased yet further to 133'000, (36) which suggests that the ball diameter was reduced further to approximately 9mm. The balls were retained in the device by sealing the hole with a bung. (37) The steel balls were intended to prevent a nuclear detonation even if the explosives fired accidentally, or in any conceivable accident. The ball bearings had to be removed through the hole in the bomb casing during flight preparation, after the bomb was winched into the aircraft. The ball bearings then had to be re-inserted into the lowered and upturned bomb before transport back to the bomb store. The batteries were also installed before flight, and the neutron generator enabled, and without the final safety device of the ball bearings installed, these weapons were armed and live, and the RAF view was that they were too dangerous to be flown on exercises. Bomber Command exercises demonstrated that flight preparation followed by a scramble take-off could not be reduced below thirty minutes with the Green Grass warhead fitted into the improved Yellow Sun casing, (38) and on exercises in bad weather and at night, a ninety minute scramble was the norm. (39)

An accident was reported in the autumn-winter-spring of 1958-59 when the steel ball retaining bung was inadvertently removed and 6'500 one inch diameter steel ball bearings the size of gobstoppers exited onto the floor, (40) leaving the bomb armed and vulnerable, and the Royal Air Force were so nervous of the outcome of a fire in storage, that permission was sought to store the bombs inverted, so that a loss of the bung could not end with the steel balls on the floor, and the HEU unprotected against a subsequent explosion. (41) Even without the partial nuclear detonation feared by the RAF, there was "a risk of catastrophe". (42)

Deployment and carriage

Deployment was to be at RAF Wittering and Vulcan squadrons at RAF Finningley and Scampton, although at Scampton a problem arose because there were no suitable storage and workshop facilities on base at Scampton. The weapon was to be stored nearby at Scampton's off-base specialist weapon storage and maintenance facility at RAF Faldingworth, seven miles away. The embargo on transport of assembled Violet Club weapons on public roads was a subject of much head-scratching, and there are declassified files that show that an exception was made for this site. (43) The first weapon was delivered in April 1958, and the fifth and last was due for delivery on 27 November 1958, (44) although there are suggestions that this date may have slipped to May 1959, just in time to be retired from service. (45)

Carriage was by Vulcan medium bombers only, the Victor being later into service, with release at high altitude only, using the same techiques as adopted for Blue Danube. The Violet Club casing had identical ballistic properties to Blue Danube to minimise development time and cost.

RAF dissatisfaction

Violet Club/Green Grass struggled to meet the Chiefs of Staff requirement for a high yield Interim Megaton Weapon as specified with a megaton range yield. It was a cobbling together of elements of at least two other designs, Green Bamboo and Orange Herald, both inherently unstable designs, each with fissile cores that were greater than one uncompressed critical mass. A hastily devised nuclear safety mechanism added to overcome the warhead's inherent instability was less than adequate to ensure safety in several scenarios identified by the RAF. One such scenario was that of an aircraft fire while a Violet Club bomb was loaded in the aircraft with the safety balls removed. The best advice AWRE could offer was to drench the area with fire retardant while lowering the weapon to the ground for a quick getaway. Or lowering the weapon to re-insert the steel balls. (46) Without the steel balls inserted, a road traffic accident on the airfield that crushed or deformed the hollow spherical fissile core was sufficient to initiate uncontrolled fission. With 1'500 lbs (689 kg) of HE in the bomb, (47) a large 'dirty bomb' was a real possibility, and contributed to the restrictions on road movement on and off base.

Violet Club had to be armed before flight and take-off was likely to be hazardous, and therefore the weapon couldn't be used on an airborne alert, (48) and couldn't be jettisoned when armed. Landing on return to base with an armed bomb was too hazardous to contemplate. The aircraft's bomb release mechanism's ferry flight weight limit of 11'100 lbs was inadequate for the bomb with the ballbearing safety device installed, (49) so Violet Club couldn't be flown to a remote dispersal base in accordance with RAF strategy planned for periods of heightened international tension, (50) and that was a source of great disatisfaction for the RAF, because the dispersal plan was central to RAF strategy. Strategic Air Command bomber bases were mostly located deep within the North American landmass, and had considerable warning time before short-range missiles launched from off-shore could reach their bases, and had adequate time to scramble their aircraft. Unlike SAC, all ten RAF Bomber Command main bases were within range of short-range missiles launched from off-shore or Eastern Europe, and had only minutes after receipt of warning in which to scramble their aircraft. The ten main bases were therefore supplemented by twenty-six dispersal airfields, located from Kent, close to the English Channel, to Cornwall, Wales and Ulster in the west, to the north east and the Western Isles of Scotland. At times of international tension, bombers were to disperse with their weapons around these distant airfields. Violet Club, being unmovable by road when assembled, unarmed, and not able to be flown unarmed to the bomber's disperal airfield, effectively wrecked RAF strategic dispersal plans. The RAF were aware of these shortcomings when they agreed to accept Violet Club as an emergency capability weapon for a short period, with the proviso that after approximately one year a more developed variant of the Green Grass warhead fitted into a better, modern casing, Yellow Sun, would be introduced. It would have in-flight arming with a mechanism to jettison the steel ball safety device only if the bombers were ordered beyond their fail-safe point. RAF chagrin was in large part because that improved weapon was never produced, and the Green Grass ground-armed warhead installed in Yellow Sun casings soldiered on for four years, until 1963, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, with the RAF unable to disperse its bombers.

The warhead installed in Violet Club was never proof-tested, and AWRE estimated its yield at 500 kilotons, based on the Christmas Island test of Orange Herald. Mr W.J.Challens of AWRE who later became the Director of AWRE claimed to the Air Staff that it met the specification because

A weapon of one half megaton is considered to be in the megaton range."   (51)

A statement that returned to haunt AWRE when later estimates revised the yield downwards to 400 kt. (52) Challens also stated to the Air Staff on behalf of AWRE that

"AWRE were almost completely sure that a nuclear explosion would not occur if the balls are in -


but in the absence of trial-proof he could not guarantee it."   (53)

It is hardly surprising that his qualification of 'almost' did not instil confidence in the Service users, and the non-nuclear elements of the weapon were not adequately tested either, as this RAF Bomber Command instruction indicates.

"Aircraft engines must not be run with Violet Club loaded on the aircraft with the safety
device [of steel balls] in place. The engines must not be started until the weapon is prepared
for an actual operational sortie."   (54) [To prevent the balls vibrating like a bag of jellybeans].

" ... uncertainty exists about the effects of movement with the balls inserted."   (55)

Other engineering specialists were also unimpressed with the warhead. Dr S.Jones, writing on behalf of the Armaments Dept at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnbourgh described the nuclear safety device as a:

"very unsatisfactory type of nuclear safety device that was essential for Green Grass ... "   (56)

A senior officer, an Air Commodore, the Director of Operations at Bomber Command, writing on 26 Jan 1959, referring to the flight preparation time and recall after take-off said:

"I think the twenty minutes required to make the weapon 'ready' [for take-off] impacts on Bomber
Command's plans to no small extent: and it is not very 'safe' once this action has commenced.
Return to base after recall, may be hazardous. We want a better safety device."   (57)

A Wing Commander at RAF Bomber Command, a Bomber Operations staff officer, minuted his senior, the Air Commodore quoted above with this comment, dated May 1959:

"This minute means that Violet Club and Yellow Sun [both with the Green Grass warhead]
are not "in the megaton range" at all, notwithstanding the extraordinary measures taken
and costs involved for what we thought to be a megaton capability. This ... leads me to the
belief that production of Green Grass be curtailed. I cannot imagine any commercial
organisation continuing to buy a device that so patently fails to meet the requirement,
or to be misled without protest as the Air Ministry has so consistently been by AWRE."   (58)

Storage, maintenance and servicing

The complete weapon was not of the modern variety of nuclear weapon that is not normally servicable by the armed forces in the frontline, and returned at intervals to the manufacturer for service. Violet Club, like Blue Danube before it, was intended to be serviced by the user, the RAF, at air bases, without assistance from the civilian manufacturers. However, the RAF had little experience of nuclear weapons, security was very restrictive, and few people outside AWRE had a firm understanding of nuclear technology, or the associated fuzing and firing technologies.

The weapon was not supplied to the RAF whole, fully assembled, ready for use, but as a series of parts, some major sub-assemblies, eg. the nose section, the tail section, the centre section, and the warhead. Unlike the earlier Blue Danube weapon, the fissile core of Green Grass was an integral part of the warhead and could not be removed without a complete strip-down of the warhead. The unstable nature of the warhead, with its fissile core greater than one uncompressed criticial mass, precluded it being assembled before delivery, and so was assembled on each airbase by a team of civilian staff from AWRE, with some assistance from RAF technicians. (59)

AWRE stipulated that each Green Grass warhead must be stripped-down at six-monthly intervals (60) for a thorough inspection, taking three weeks per weapon, and done by AWRE civilian staff at RAF air bases, with some help from the RAF. A further impediment was the restriction placed on locating more than two weapons in the same maintenance and storage building, and not closer together than six feet. (61) A great strain was placed on the RAF's other operational requirement to service Blue Danube weapons in the available facilities. The RAF were unhappy with these arrangements, and the poor standard of design of Green Grass that had led to that situation.

AWRE were concerned to restrict knowledge of the inner workings of the weapon to as few people outside AWRE as possible. (62) Their civilian staff were doing the routine maintenance work at airbases that senior RAF staff officers considered should be done by uniformed personnel in order to comply with the Geneva Convention, which forbade civilian workers being used in the front line preparing weapons for use. (63) Attempts by the RAF and Air Ministry to produce a service manual TSD.779 vol 1 (64) for uniformed servicemen met with determined opposition from AWRE at the highest level, (65) which at one stage refused to co-operate with production of a maintainer's manual, claiming that the manual jeopardised security, and that RAF maintainers had no need to know what was inside the weapon, and what uniformed service personnel could not see, they did not need to know of. (66) RAF staff officers and the Air Ministry asserted their right to determine the security procedures with the Service, and that their servicing policy would not be determined by an external, civilian research establishment, (67) if the RAF were to assume full responsibility for storage, maintenance and security of the weapon. The RAF asserted that some knowledge of the inner workings and content of the warhead was essential to Service morale and efficiency. (68) Without the limited knowledge contained within a service manual, their servicing personnel would not be able to carry out the servicing task, (69) morale would decline, and safety would be compromised. RAF engineering staff officers recommended that the RAF should only accept responsibility for the safe custody of Violet Club, with AWRE completely responsible for everything concerning maintenance and preparation, and that the RAF should not accept any delegation of servicing tasks until a servicing manual was issued to RAF engineering personnel. (70)

Storage temperature limitations were exacting. (71) The limits specified were principally aimed at maintaining the HE implosion material in good condition, controlling differential rates of thermal expansion and contraction between the HE and other components, and prevention of cracking and distortion of the HE. Short-term temperature limits set for an operational mission were less restrictive initially at 5°C - 40°C, but later raised to 18°C - 40°C, while in the aircraft's heated bomb bay. Long-term ground storage temperature limits were more rigorous at 18°C - 28°C in heated and air-conditioned magazines. Weapons held at immediate readiness for 30 days alongside the aircraft on the airfield, were stored inside a heated pantechnican parked alongside each aircraft, and temperature limits were as for the heated aircraft bomb bay, with some parts of the weapon were kept warm using an electric blanket.

The large amount of high explosive (approx 1'500 lbs or 682 kg) contained in each weapon was as great a concern as radioactive components, and the number permitted in each storage building was strictly limited to two, and not closer together than six feet.

Variants

There were no variants or derivatives of Violet Club, although the warhead itself, Green Grass, was used in a later weapon, Yellow Sun Mk.1, and there were plans to install Green Grass in the Avro Blue Steel Mk.1 stand-off bomb carried by Vulcan and Victor medium bombers. These plans were cancelled when a better warhead was made available after the 1958 US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement, often referred to informally as the 1958 Bi-Lateral.

Further development

There was no further development of Violet Club. It was a one-off design, with no development potential, and was succeeded by a radically different concept, the fission-fusion-fission type of thermonuclear warhead, referred to above as the Type B.

The Interim Megaton Weapon, alias Knobkerry, alias Green Grass, that wasn't really of megaton yield, used in Violet Club and Yellow Sun Mk.1 had another distinction. It was the last entirely British nuclear weapon deployed with the RAF. All later weapons were of entirely American design, or had significant amounts of American design know-how incorporated in their design following the 1958 Bi-Lateral. The RAF never deployed a thermonuclear weapon of wholly home-grown design. Although lessons were undoubtedly learned from them, and some features incorporated into later warheads, the thermonuclear devices tested in the atmosphere at Christmas Island in Operation Grapple were all abandoned, because AWRE no longer had any need for them. They were all experimental devices that required further work, time, and considerable amounts of money to develop them into reliable weapons able to withstand the rough-and-tumble of Service life. The American designs offered in late 1958 were fully tested and Service-engineered, and cheap to produce. (72) They were manufactured in Britain from British materials (athough many non-nuclear components were purchased in the United States) (73) from American-supplied blueprints. (74) They were British property, and there were no American political constraints on their independent use. For the Treasury, the deal must have appeared truly wonderful. Violet Club and Yellow Sun Mk.1 bridged the gap for a few short years until these American designed warheads became available.

Unlike the earlier weapons deployed with the RAF, Blue Danube and Red Beard, the fissile material for Violet Club was embedded in the implosion sphere (75) and could not be removed and stored separately. Also, unlike the earlier weapons, they did not use a plutonium fissile core, instead using HEU for the reasons stated above. They were very large and 'dirty' fission weapons; the largest pure or unboosted fission bombs deployed by any nuclear power before or since.

Although a fission warhead of any given yield would use more HEU (76) (and be less expensive) than a warhead constructed from plutonium, a fission weapon of Violet Club size was simply impossible to construct with a plutonium core with the technology available, because the problems associated with predetonation, caused by Pu-240 impurities in reactor-produced Pu-239 were insurmountable, at that time, and with this design. With the technology of the period, HEU was the only possible usable fissile material for an unboosted fission weapon of this large size. Consequently, the fissile core of Violet Club was considerably cheaper built from HEU than plutonium because the industrial costs of producing the two fissile materials was widely different, with plutonium being over 640% more costly than HEU. (77) An added bonus was that the United States was supplying the UK with their lower cost HEU, while the UK were able to sell their expensive and surplus military grade plutonium to the United States, which must have cheered the Treasury somewhat. A further bonus was that US produced HEU was priced at less than one third of the British cost of HEU production, at 1958 prices. (78) In this period, the UK purchased over seven tons of US produced HEU, much of it finding its way into the Interim Megaton Weapon. Enough to produce approximately one hundred Violet Club bombs.

Retirement

All five Violet Club weapons were retired by the end of May 1959. (79) The warheads were removed and retrofitted to the new Yellow Sun Mk.1 casings, where they were to be adapted for in-flight removal of the steel ballbearing nuclear safety device, using the smaller balls. These plans for in-flight arming were never implemented, the equipment was never deployed, and the Green Grass warheads from Violet Club were transferred to Yellow Sun Mk1 casings intact. The failure of AWRE and RAE at Farnborough to implement the in-flight arming plans was a source of much of the dissatisfaction expressed by senior RAF staff officers, partly because of safety concerns; partly because of servicing issues; but mainly because the RAF Bomber Command dispersal plan was unusable.

The casings were scrapped, and none survive in museums. The five Green Grass warheads from Violet Club with a further thirtytwo warheads built for Yellow Sun Mk.1 survived until 1963 when all were replaced by thermonuclear warheads of American design.

Where can I see one?

There are no surviving examples of either Violet Club or the Green Grass warhead, the Interim Megaton Weapon. Only one similar bomb carcass, an example of Blue Danube, survives in the AWE Historical Collection. This collection is kept on a secure site at AWE Aldermaston which is closed to the general public. Only in exceptional circumstances will AWE and the MoD invite bona-fide researchers to view the collection.

References

W.Cocroft and R.Thomas. Cold War, Building for Nuclear Confrontation 1946-1989, English Heritage, 2003. ISBN 1-873592-69-8

nuclearweaponarchive.org

Dr Richard Moore, a Visiting Fellow at the University of Southampton. A Glossary of Nuclear Weapons. 'Prospero' Journal of the BROHP Spring 2004.

University of Southampton, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies/Nuclear History Working Paper No1.

http://www.skomer.u-net.com/projects/bluedanube.htm Dated, but still a superb source.

A.J.R.Groom. British thinking about nuclear weapons.

  Published Francis Pinter Ltd, London, 1974. ISBN 0-903-804-018  Dated, but a superb source for the political background for the early Cold War period.

Humphrey Wynn. RAF Strategic Nuclear Forces: their origins, roles and deployment 1946-69.
Published HMSO London, 1994. ISBN 0-1177-2833-0 Copyright MoD.

Lorna Arnold. Britain and the H-Bomb. Published MacMillan-Palgrave, London 2001.
ISBN 0-333-75685-0 hardback, ISBN 0-333-94742-8 softback, in North America: ISBN 0-312-23518-6 hardback. Copyright MoD.

Lorna Arnold. A Very Special Relationship: British Atomic Weapon Trials in Australia.
Published by HMSO, London, 1987. ISBN 01177 2833 0

Norris R.S, Burrows A.S and Fieldhouse R.W. The Nuclear Weapons Databook Vol 5. British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons.
Published by the Westview Press, Oxford, 1994. ISBN 0813 31612 X

Professor J.E.Harris, MBE, FREng, FRS, FIM. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews. Plutonium: from stardust to Star Wars.
Published ISR 2001, London, Vol 26 No 1. ISSN 0308 0188

Professor J.E.Harris, MBE, FREng, FRS, FIM. Interdisciplinary Science Reviews. The threat of nuclear terrorism.
Published ISR 1999, London, Vol 4 No 2. ISSN 0308 0188

avrovulcan.org.uk/nukes/violetclub.htm Photo of Green Grass, the Interim Megaton Weapon shown here.

avrovulcan.org.uk/nukes/bluedanube.htm Photo of the Blue Danube bomb casing used for Violet Club, shown here

BANG, from the Joy of Hi-Tech by Rodford Edmiston.

Footnotes

TNA (the National Archives, London). AIR 2/13759 E18B. Megaton bomb (Zodiac Mk 3).  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13759 E14A p1. Megaton bomb (Zodiac Mk 3).  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13759 E18B. Megaton bomb (Zodiac Mk 3).  ^ up

Lorna Arnold. Britain and the H-Bomb, p61-62, 66, 84. Published MacMillan-Palgrave, London 2001.  ISBN 0-333-75685-0 hardback,
ISBN 0-333-94742-8 softback, in North America: ISBN 0-312-23518-6 hardback. Copyright MoD.  ^ up

Dr Richard Moore: University of Southampton, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies: Nuclear History Working Paper No1.  ^ up

Humphrey Wynn.  RAF Strategic Nuclear Forces: their origins, roles and deployment 1946-69, p193.  Published HMSO, London, 1994. ISBN 0-1177-2833-0 Copyright MoD.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/1193 E1 and E5 part transcription. Warhead for a medium range missile: Air Staff requirement OR 1142 Orange Herald (DAW plans action) 1955-1958.  ^ up

Lorna Arnold. Britain and the H-Bomb, p87.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13746 E16A p1. Warhead for medium range ballistic missile BLUE STREAK (OR 1139 and 1142) 1955-1960.  ^ up

TNA AB 16/1888 E111. Grapple 1 and Green Bamboo weapons tests; finance.  ^ up

TNA AB 16/3878 Appendix 4. Forward prices of fissile materials covering dates 1957-1961.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13759 E14A p1. Megaton bomb (Zodiac Mk 3).  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13759 E18B. Megaton bomb (Zodiac Mk 3).  ^ up
Lorna Arnold. Britain and the H-Bomb, p147, p236.  ^ up

Lorna Arnold. Britain and the H-Bomb, p147.  ^ up

Dr Richard Moore: University of Southampton, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies: Nuclear History Working Paper No1.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13680 E11A. Megaton bomb (OR 1136) 1954-1956.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13680 E46B. Megaton bomb (OR 1136) 1954-1956.  ^ up
TNA AVIA 65/1116 E18 p4. MoD Defence Research Policy Committee: Atomic Energy Sub-Committee; agenda and minutes.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13680 E46B p1 para 2. Megaton bomb (OR 1136) 1954-1956.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13680 E11A. Megaton bomb (OR 1136) 1954-1956.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13680 E46 p1-2 para 5. Megaton bomb (OR 1136) 1954-1956.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13680 E46B p02 (c). Megaton bomb (OR 1136) 1954-1956.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13718 E24 pages 1-2. Violet Club: policy, 1957-1958. Letter from ACAS (OR) to DCAS notifying him 14 April 1958, of formal clearance for Service use of Violet Club received from DGAW and transmitted to C-in-C Bomber Command 11 April 1958.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/1218 E167. Violet Club correspondence 1957-1959.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13718 E24B. Violet Club: policy, 1957-1958. Letter from ACAS (OR) to C-in-C Bomber Command, 11 April 1958.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13718 E24B Annex 1, p2. Violet Club: policy 1957-1958. Annex to ACAS (OR) letter to C-in-C Bomber Command, dated 11 April 1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13718 E24B. Violet Club: policy, 1957-1958. Letter from ACAS (OR) to C-in-C Bomber Command, 11 April 1958.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/1218 E38. Violet Club correspondence 1957-1959.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/1218 E35. Violet Club correspondence 1957-1959.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/1155 E194, para 11.  10'000 lb HE MC bomb: ASRs 1947-1962.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13705 E27A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/1218 E183(a). Violet Club correspondence 1957-1959.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13705 E15A p2 para I. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up
TNA AVIA 65/1218 E43. Violet Club correspondence 1957-1959.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13705 E56A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13705 E58A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13718 E7A (4). Violet Club: policy 1957-1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13718 E24B p1 para 4. Violet Club: policy, 1957-1958. Letter from ACAS (OR) to C-in-C Bomber Command, 11 April 1958.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13718 E21A p1 para 3. Violet Club: policy, 1957-1958. Statement by W.J.Challens on behalf of AWRE, recorded in the minutes of a conference at the Air Ministry to discuss the acceptance standard of Violet Club.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13681 E17A p3 para 2.2. Megaton bomb (OR 1136) 1957.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/777 E2. Blue Steel warhead: installation 1957-1959.  ^ up

Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal No26 (2001) p96 ISSN 1361 4231 Report of a seminar on the RAF experience of nuclear weapons. Air Commodore Owen Truelove, an Engineer Officer nuclear weapons specialist's account.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/777 E9 p3. Blue Steel warhead: installation 1957-1959.  ^ up
TNA AVIA 65/777 E37 p4. Blue Steel warhead: installation 1957-1959.  ^ up

David J.Hawkins. Keeping the Peace, the Aldermaston Story, p52 para 03. Published Pen and Sword Books in association with AWE plc Media and publishing group. 2000. ISBN 0-85052-775-9 Crown Copyright 2000. An account commissioned by the MoD written by a former Manager of Corporate Communications at AWE. Although useful in parts it should not be overlooked that this is written by a former PR officer at AWE, tasked with producing an account for AWE's public relations group.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/1218 E15. Violet Club correspondence 1957-1959.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13705 E62A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13705 E62A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up

Royal Air Force Historical Society Journal No26 (2001) p96 ISSN 1361 4231 Report of a seminar on the RAF experience of nuclear weapons. Air Commodore Owen Truelove, an Engineer Officer nuclear weapons specialist's account.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13705 E36A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up
TNA AVIA 65/1218 E181. Violet Club: correspondence 1957-1959.  ^ up
TNA AVIA 65/1218 E183. Violet Club: correspondence 1957-1959.  ^ up
TNA AVIA 65/1218 E191. Violet Club: correspondence 1957-1959.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13705 E47A p3. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13705 E62A p2. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13718 E24B p1 & 2, paras 4 & 6. Violet Club: policy, 1957-1958.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13718 E24B Annex 1, p3, para 13, item (i). Violet Club: policy 1957-1958. Annex to ACAS (OR) letter to C-in-C Bomber Command, dated 11 April 1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13705 E25A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13705 E36A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13705 E38A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13705 E23A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/1116 E20. MoD Defence Research Policy Committee: Atomic Energy Sub-Committee; agenda and minutes 1957-1960.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13718 E17A (c). Violet Club: policy 1957-1958.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13718 E24B Annex 1 p3. para 13 item (i). Violet Club: policy 1957-1958. Annex to letter from ACAS (OR) to C-in-C Bomber Command, dated 11 April 1958.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/777 E35 p5. Blue Steel warhead: installation 1957-1959.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13718 E24B Annex 1 p2. para 12. Violet Club: policy 1957-1958. Annex to letter from ACAS (OR) to C-in-C Bomber Command, dated 11 April 1958.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/1218 E35. Violet Club correspondence 1957-1959.  ^ up

Humphrey Wynn. RAF Strategic Nuclear Forces: their origins, roles and deployment 1946-69, p448, Dispersal Map. Published HMSO London1994.  ISBN 0-1177-2833-0 Copyright MoD.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13718 E21A p2 para 8. Violet Club: policy, 1957-1958. Statement by W.J.Challens on behalf of AWRE, recorded in the minutes of a conference at the Air Ministry to discuss the acceptance standard of Violet Club.  ^ up
TNA CAB 21/4533 E3 page 2. Cabinet papers: nuclear weapons nomenclature: policy. 1955.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13705 E56A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13705 E58A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13705 E61A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13718 E21A p2 para 8. Violet Club: policy, 1957-1958. Statement by W.J.Challens on behalf of AWRE, recorded in the minutes of a conference at the Air Ministry to discuss the acceptance standard of Violet Club.  ^ up
TNA CAB 21/4533 E3 page 2. Cabinet papers: nuclear weapons nomenclature: policy. 1955.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13718 E15A (3) (d). Violet Club: policy 1957-1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13718 E21A p2, para 7, item 14, and p2, para 8, item 15. Violet Club: policy 1957-1958.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/777 E75 p4(9)(a). Blue Steel warhead: installation 1957-1959.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13705 E30A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966. Handwitten addendum.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13705 E59A. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13718 E24B p1 para 3. Violet Club: policy, 1957-1958. Letter from ACAS (OR) to C-in-C Bomber Command, 11 April 1958.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13718 E24B Annex 1, p1, para 3. Violet Club: policy, 1957-1958. Annex to ACAS (OR) letter to C-in-C Bomber Command, 11 April 1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13705 E27A p1, para 3. Yellow Sun: policy 1957-1966.  ^ up

TNA AIR 2/13718 E24B Annex 1, p1, para 6. Violet Club: policy, 1957-1958. Letter from ACAS (OR) to C-in-C Bomber Command, 11 April 1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 20/11316 E12B p1(a). Nuclear weapons service manuals: policy 1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 20/11316 E17A p2, para 4(a). Nuclear weapons service manuals: policy 1958.  ^ up
TNA AIR 20/11316 summary p2, para 4(a). Nuclear weapons service manuals: policy 1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 20/11316 E1A p1. Nuclear weapons service manuals: policy 1958.  ^ up
TNA AIR 2/13718 E24B p1 para 4. Violet Club: policy, 1957-1958. Letter from ACAS (OR) to C-in-C Bomber Command, 11 April 1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 20/11316 E3A p1, para 6. Nuclear weapons service manuals: policy 1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 20/11316 E3A p1, para 1(a). Nuclear weapons service manuals: policy 1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 20/11316 E4A para 4. Nuclear weapons service manuals: policy 1958.  ^ up
TNA AIR 20/11316 E4B para 9, para 10. Nuclear weapons service manuals: policy 1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 20/11316 E1A p1, para 3(a). Nuclear weapons service manuals: policy 1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 20/11316 E3A p1. Nuclear weapons service manuals: policy 1958.  ^ up

TNA AIR 20/11316 E3A p1, para 6. Nuclear weapons service manuals: policy 1958.  ^ up
TNA AIR 20/11316 E4B p1, para 5, para 9, para 10. Nuclear weapons service manuals: policy 1958.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/1218 E24. Violet Club correspondence 1957-1959.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/1771 E24 p1, para 3. Defence Committee on Nuclear Requirements 1959-1963.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/1064 E74 p1, p2. Inspection of atomic weapons 1958-1960. Twenty items and sub-assemblies purchased in the United States for Red Snow production in the United Kingdom.  ^ up

Lorna Arnold. Britain and the H-Bomb, p214.  ^ up
Lorna Arnold. Britain and the H-Bomb, p213. Over 6'000 individual component and assembly blueprints.  ^ up

TNA PREM 11/2944 E185A. Prime Minister's papers. Red Snow thermonuclear warhead manufacture at Burghfield: transportation issues 1959-1960.  ^ up
TNA PREM 11/2944 E185B. Prime Minister's papers. Red Snow thermonuclear warhead manufacture at Burghfield: transportation issues 1959-1960.  ^ up

Charles S.Grace. Nuclear Weapons: Principles, Effects and Survivability. Published: Royal College of Military Science, Shrivenham, Wiltshire, UK, and Brasseys, 1994. ISBN 0-0804-0992-X  ^ up

TNA AB 16/3878 Appendix 4, p1. Forward prices of fissile materials. 1957-1961. Letter dated 07 March 1959 from AEA to DAWRE.   ^ up

TNA AB 16/3878 Appendix 4. Forward prices of fissile materials. 1957-1961. Attached handwritten note identifies the US price of HEU @ £6'000/kg at 1958/59 prices, and the cost to the RAF from UK production as £21'000/kg at 1958/59 prices. Cost of Pu-239 to the RAF from UK production was £135'000/kg at 1958/59 prices.  ^ up

TNA AVIA 65/1116 E20. MoD Defence Research Policy Committee: Atomic Energy Sub-Committee; agenda and minutes.  ^ up

See also

• Green Bamboo
• Green Grass
• ASR.1136
• OR.1136
• Orange Herald
• Yellow Sun
• Interim Megaton Weapon
• Knobkerry

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